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Robert J. Currie†

Introduction

Duty of Care: Donoghue to Cooper

F

T

he duty of care is the analytical starting point for all
negligence claims. In the much-revered 4 case of
Donoghue v. Stevenson, 5 Lord Atkin laid out the ‘‘neighbour principle’’ that, in effect, created the modern law of
negligence:

ast-paced growth in the technology sector has led to
regular discussion of whether and to what extent the
law is able to ‘‘keep up with’’ technology. In particular,
the common law, with its tradition of conservatism and
incremental change, is confronted with developments
that do not lend themselves readily to the application of
precedent and analogy. One need only survey the debate
raging in the U.S. regarding the applicability of commonlaw doctrines of trespass 1 to the Internet to wonder if the
law as it currently exists provides the tools needed to
deal with tech issues in a manner that is fair, just, and
consistent with both larger legal norms and society’s
technological needs.

You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions
which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The
answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called
in question. 6

Lord Atkin’s famous dictum, while revolutionary in
scope, actually built on various prototypical forms of the
negligence action that had developed. It was already settled law that a duty of care was owed as between doctors
and patients, or lawyers and clients, for example. 7 Donoghue, however, ‘‘established the proposition that the
duty of care owed in negligence actions is not confined
to a closed list of specific relationships, but is based upon
an open-ended and general concept of a relationship of
proximity which is capable of extension to new situations’’. 8 Negligence, then, was universally adaptable,
always potentially available — a tort for all seasons.

Clearly, a larger conversation is taking place
regarding the law’s ability to regulate and control technological activities, what form that control should take,
and even whether it is appropriate at all. 2 The goal of
this article is to contribute to the Canadian end of this
conversation, albeit in a modest way, by inquiring into
the continued viability of negligence law in this setting
(i.e., whether the common law of negligence as it currently exists has sufficient capacity to handle ‘‘tech
torts’’). The focal point of this comment will be the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Cooper v. Hobart, 3 which appears to have made some
significant changes to the elements of ‘‘duty of care’’, the
foundational negligence concept. The Court framed its
decision as refining duty of care analysis in order to
properly deal with ‘‘novel claims’’ (i.e., those for which
there is not an established or analogous duty of care in
the existing case law). Given that the growth of electronic commerce and Internet usage continues to spawn
‘‘novel’’ legal issues, Cooper is an appropriate starting
point for a discussion of whether the law, as it stands,
provides courts with the tools to determine when and
where new duties of care should arise.

I do not propose to discuss fully the development of
the duty of care within Canadian law, and refer the
reader to the leading authorities in that regard. 9 However, a short review of the major touchstones is necessary
to provide background for the thoughts that follow. Lord
Atkin’s ‘‘neighbour principle’’ was developed and
expanded by the House of Lords in a series of cases 10
that culminated in the 1978 judgment of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council. In
that case, His Lordship set out a two-stage test for determining duty of care:
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First, one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such
that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter
— in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly,
if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary
to consider whether there are any considerations which
ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty
or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to
which a breach of it may give rise. . . . 11
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As Professor Klar has noted, this was a significant
development in that the establishment of ‘‘a sufficient
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood’’ gave rise to
a presumptive duty, which could only be rebutted by
pressing policy concerns. ‘‘[I]n reaffirming that there is a
universal formula of duty applicable to all cases of
alleged negligence, [Anns] divided the elements of duty
into two segments: (i) a relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood and (ii) policy’’. 12 However, Anns also
contained the most explicit recognition to that date that
the neighbour principle contains within it limiting factors: that it was not just a mechanism by which the scope
of negligence could be expanded, but simultaneously
provided the ability for courts to circumscribe it as well.
Justice Linden has recently remarked on this aspect:
Duty is a negative doctrine, a limiting tool, a way of circumscribing the scope of negligence law. It denies, restricts, curtails, confines, controls the spread of negligence law by
keeping cases out of the hands of over-sympathetic juries
and trial judges. By means of duty, courts may decide, as a
question of law, that there is no duty owed by this defendant to this plaintiff for this loss. The determination of no
duty, however, addresses a global policy, not an evaluation
of specific fact situations . . . [O]ver time the duty issue
changed from ‘‘identifying where liability is imposed to
those where it is not.’’ 13

Nonetheless, it became apparent that the ‘‘presumptive duty’’ approach was expansionist in nature. The
Supreme Court of Canada adopted Anns in its 1983
decision of Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, 14 and proceeded
in a series of cases thereafter to expand the reach of
negligence law, finding duties of care in ‘‘novel’’ situations where none had existed before. 15 In all of these, the
two-step approach to duty of care was utilized, and it
seemed relatively clear that if foreseeability could be
found in the first step, it created sufficient proximity or
neighbourhood for the presumptive duty of care to
arise. 16 Foreseeability was, in turn, a modest hurdle, even
an ‘‘empty vessel’’, 17 since it was decidedly rare for a
plaintiff who had indeed suffered damage to be found to
be unforeseeable to the defendant. 18
With the release of Cooper in 2001, however, this
pattern appeared to be brought up short. Cooper was
one of a group of investors in British Columbia who
alleged financial damage due to a failure on the part of
the B.C. Registrar of Mortgage Brokers to properly regulate the brokers under its purview. Cooper applied to
have the claim certified as a class action, and the Registrar countered that the claim disclosed no cause of
action on the basis that no duty of care was owed. The

Registrar was successful before the Supreme Court of
Canada, which took the opportunity to ‘‘revisit’’ the
Anns test. 19
In revisiting, the Court appears to have fundamentally changed the analytical framework of what it nonetheless continues to call the ‘‘ Anns test.’’ It accomplished
this by breaking out the terms ‘‘foreseeability’’ and ‘‘proximity’’ from the first step of the test, asserting (despite
over a decade of jurisprudence to the contrary) that each
was a discrete element that had to be proven in order to
ground the duty of care. Foreseeability remained as
straightforward as it had always been; if ‘‘a reasonable
person would have viewed the harm as foreseeable’’,
then this portion of the test was made out. 20 Proximity,
however, was something different; specifically, it became
a second sub-step in the first step of the Anns test:
(2) are there reasons, notwithstanding the proximity
between the parties established in the first part of this test,
that tort liability should not be recognized here? The proximity analysis involved at the first stage of the Anns test
focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant. These factors include questions
of policy, in the broad sense of that word. 21

Proximity is to be determined by reference to the
established categories of negligence. If a relationship
between plaintiff and defendant has given rise to a duty
of care in a previous case, then proximity is settled; if the
relationship is analogous to a previously established duty
of care, then ‘‘a prima facie duty of care may be posited’’. 22 This is not to say, the Court assures us, that novel
duties of care cannot be introduced, since ‘‘. . . the law of
negligence . . . [is] still permit[ed] . . . to evolve to meet the
needs of new circumstances’’. 23 However, the relationship will have to be carefully scrutinized to see whether
it justifies a finding of proximity:
Defining the relationship may involve looking at expectations, representations, reliance and the property or other
interests involved. Essentially, these are factors that allow us
to evaluate the closeness of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant and to determine whether it is
just and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a
duty of care. . . . 24

Since these step-one policy concerns arise from the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,
step two of the Anns test requires consideration of what
the Court called ‘‘residual policy considerations’’ 25
outside that relationship. The Court gave as examples
the spectre of unlimited liability, the existence of other
legal remedies, 26 and in Cooper specifically, the need of
the Registrar to balance public and private interests with
the fact that the Registrar was making quasi-judicial decisions, inter alia. 27
In effect, what the Court did in Cooper was insert a
new, third step into the two-step Anns test, purportedly
as more explicit recognition of there being policy considerations inherent in both parts of the test. This was not
simply a semantic or academic distinction, however, 28
because it introduced a conservative, incrementalist
approach that is likely to facilitate the curtailment of
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negligence law (to use Justice Linden’s phraseology)
rather than its expansion. As Professor Klar comments:
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Denying that there is a duty at the first stage because there is
a lack of proximity recognizes that a coherent legal system,
of which tort law is only a part, must create limits to tort
law’s reach. It refuses to concede to the proposition that
there is a presumptive tort law duty merely because of foreseeability. It asserts right at the start that some types of
disputes are not amenable to a tort law resolution . . . An
approach that is more resistant to the recognition of a presumptive duty in the first stage is decidedly more cautious
with regard to the extension of negligence law. 29

Commentators 30 (including this one) are in general
agreement that this more cautious approach is indeed
what the Court was driving at in Cooper, in no small
part because it mirrors the retreat from the expansionism of Anns by the House of Lords during the 1980s
and early 1990s. 31 In contrast to our Supreme Court, the
House of Lords explicitly rejected Anns on judicial
policy grounds, but they did re-implement a more incremental approach by inserting a criterion of ‘‘proximity’’
between the Anns stages. 32 While not as explicit as Canadian courts have been about the general policy component that is inherent in the duty exercise, 33 the House of
Lords nonetheless sounded the horn for their conservative retreat loudly, as opposed to the subtle, ‘‘back-door’’
approach utilized by the Supreme Court. 34
In the result, Canada now has a three-step approach
to duty of care. In ‘‘novel’’ cases, it will play out as follows:
(1) determine whether harm to the plaintiff would
have been a reasonably foreseeable result of the
defendant’s actions;
(2) scrutinize the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant for factors indicating ‘‘closeness’’ and
making it ‘‘just and fair’’ to impose a duty of
care; and
(3) examine the policy factors external to the relationship to determine whether a prima facie
duty of care arising from steps (1) and (2) should
nonetheless be disallowed.
Moreover, the Court appeared to find in a subsequent
case applying Cooper 35 that the plaintiff bears the legal
burden at all three parts of the test (i.e., he or she must
prove foreseeability, proximity and a lack of residual
policy factors that would otherwise negative the claim).
This is a marked departure from the previous Anns structure, where the plaintiff simply bore the burden of
proving foreseeability and the substantive policy argument was generally required of the defendant.
Dissatisfaction with the wrinkle in duty of care
introduced by Cooper has been evident. In an early comment, Professor Klar noted two major problems: first,
that the issue of whether a particular relationship fell
into or was analogous to a previously recognized category was problematic, since ‘‘there are many existing
categories which can be so broadly defined that it is
difficult to ascertain whether any case falls into them or
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represents a new category’’; 36 and second, that the distinction between the kinds of policy concerns to be
considered at the second and third steps was not at all
clear, and this could only lead to obfuscation and confusion. 37 Justice Linden has very recently surveyed the ‘‘avalanche’’ of motions spawned by Cooper and noted that
Professor Klar’s words were prophetic, in that the introduction of proximity analysis has produced ‘‘scores of
cases analyzing duty situations, often needlessly, in cases
where the duty was long settled and where, therefore,
duty should not have been analyzed’’. 38
It does seem clear that the effect of Cooper has been
to restrain the extension of duty of care, as in the
Supreme Court of Canada’s own decisions using the
framework (Cooper, Edwards 39 and Odhavji Estate v.
Woodhouse 40) where the extension of duty of care was
primarily 41 denied on proximity grounds. There is consensus, however, that without more clarity being
imported into the proximity analysis, this trend is likely
to be somewhat muddled in its execution. As Professor
Feldthusen comments:
[C]ritical terms that trigger the Anns/Cooper analysis such as
‘‘new’’ or ‘‘novel’’ duties of care, existing ‘‘categories’’ of duty,
and ‘‘analogous’’ decisions are completely fungible terms.
Courts remain relatively free to resort to precedent where
they wish, ignore it when they do not, and to distinguish it if
necessary. 42

Negligence = Cyberlaw?

D

uty of care is about establishing thresholds for
whether relationships are the proper focus of a
liability inquiry — in effect, answering the question
‘‘who should be able to sue whom?’’ As has been recognized (perhaps most successfully) by Canadian courts,
this is essentially a policy question masquerading as a
question of law, and Cooper is effective insofar as it
reiterates and reinforces this understanding of the question.
It is highly arguable, in my view, that the massive
integration of technology into the structure and fabric of
Canadian society puts us at a ‘‘threshold’’ where policy is
indeed the key question. Technology can produce relationships that are ‘‘novel’’ in the truest sense, in that they
are not analogous to any which have come before. To be
sure, this is not unique from an historical point of view.
The rise of professions such as medicine, law, and engineering produced relationships that in turn gave rise to
new duties of care as between professional and client;
the industrial revolution changed irrevocably the
dynamic between employer and employee, and ultimately produced both common-law and statutory duties
of care owed by the former to the latter. To the extent
that technology is viewed as a product, there is nothing
new about the duty of care owed by manufacturer to
consumer. Yet the profound functional integration of
technology into our daily lives elevates the products
themselves far beyond the snail in the bottle of Dono-
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ghue. Computers are not merely goods, nor are codewriting or systems design merely services; they are in
some sense the creators of new modes of human interaction, new relationships, and the tools by which these
relationships function.
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The question is whether the new formulation of
duty of care will aid the courts in coming to terms with
these new kinds of relationships and in determining
who should be protected from what kind of harm. The
rapid growth and integration of technology and the
unpredictability of result seem to demonstrate a continued need for the tort of negligence, for an expansive
approach to duty of care, in the same way that the public
needed to be protected from early modern civil engineering where advances in the field still did not prevent
bridges from falling down. This exact analogy was
employed by software specialist John McHugh of the
Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University during a recent address. 43 He underscored his
point with a description of the current state of software
evolution that speaks volumes of the void that the law
must fill:
While much of the software that we build is ‘‘pretty good,’’
we lack the link between process and product that would
permit us to predict accurately the quality of the resulting
product. We cannot give prescriptive advice to developers.
We cannot provide meaningful warranties. We cannot predict the safety, security or reliability of systems that make
extensive and critical use of software. 44

This is, from a legal standpoint, a startling admission
from an expert in the field of software design. What it
says to me is that, conceptually, the need for tort law is as
great now as at any previous time of technological
expansion, where new forces produced new relationships and, inevitably, new kinds of injury. Those injured
will need to be compensated; better and safer practices
should be encouraged, careless conduct deterred.
It is ironic, then, that at this time when we most
need the robustness of Anns and its progenitor, Donoghue, we are given Cooper. Just as the potential for novel
claims is arguably at its historical height, the lower courts
are instructed to consider the relationships involved
more carefully, more conservatively, and ensure that the
imposition of a duty of care is justified by reference to
two different sorts of policy grounds. Recall that this is a
significant break with the previous state of negligence
law, where the plaintiff could raise at least a prima facie
duty by simply making out foreseeability, a modest evidentiary burden. The plaintiff must now, it appears,
prove that imposing the duty of care is both justified by
the state of the proximity factors and not amenable to
being struck on the ‘‘residual’’ policy grounds. If properly
applied, Cooper must impede the ability of negligence
law to embrace new, technology-based relationships.
The counter-argument here might be that this is
precisely the way that the common law is supposed to
develop — by way of caution, increment, and analogy —
and that the expansionist tendencies of the Anns test

represented an aberration that has now been properly
controlled. The speed and complexity with which technological relationships are created and developed, the
argument might go, are precisely why the law must proceed with caution. New duties of care unleashed by
judges unschooled in the vagaries of technological
advance (and hoodwinked by tech-savvy counsel) are as
likely to be malevolent genies escaped from bottles
uncorked as they are to be salvation for the injured. Far
better to proceed cautiously, on the basis of established
principles, with careful consideration of the policy implications of every step. Immediate regulatory needs should
be filled in by the legislature; the common law must
know and keep to its place.
Moreover, Cooper itself may provide part of the
answer, in that it instructs the lower courts that cases
which fall into existing categories of negligence, or are
analogous thereto, do not require proximity analysis, but
at most need only be evaluated on the basis of the
residual policy considerations. Personal injury is still personal injury; pure economic loss arising from negligent
misrepresentation does not become something different
because the representation was made by way of e-mail
instead of orally.
I admit some sympathy for this argument, but in
my view, the matter is made more complex both by the
structure of Cooper and the subject matter under discussion here. First, it is not at all clear that the courts will
recognize ‘‘existing categories’’ when they see them, and
a great deal depends on how broadly or narrowly the
facts are construed and presented during the course of
the case and the reasons deciding it. Professor Klar argues
convincingly that, while Cooper and Edwards themselves were used as the platform for introducing proximity analysis on ‘‘novel’’ issues, both could just as easily
have been presented as being in line with existing duties
of care. 45 The post-Cooper case law to date demonstrates
that the lower courts are ‘‘confused about this’’, and
often fail to see established category or analogy where it
exists, compounding this with proximity analysis even in
cases where they recognize the duty of care. 46 While it is
early days yet, developments thus far are not encouraging.
The other response is that, while it may reek of 21stcentury conceit to suggest that the common law is
simply not up to the task of dealing with new technology, there is some indication that simply proceeding
by way of categorization and analogy will not be sufficient. As noted earlier, the American courts have been
struggling with the tenuousness of analogizing the
activity of web spiders to classical notions of trespass; 47
courts the world over have wrestled with determining
when the appearance of writings or remarks on the
Internet constitutes ‘‘publication’’ for the purposes of defamation claims. 48 Can viruses and worms really constitute a ‘‘nuisance’’ in the manner of seeping industrial
waste? As Professor O’Rourke has observed, ‘‘the newness
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of the medium causes courts to search for analogies to
guide decision making. However, the application of realworld analogies to the particular characteristics of virtual
space may lead to unintended consequences’’. 49
The difficulty is not only how to compare computer-based relationships with traditional physical-space
relationships, for the purpose of analogizing under
Cooper, but the inertia created by the proximity step.
The potential negligence liability of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) provides a good example. There simply is
no precedent that enables us to effectively analogize
what an ISP does and many of the relationships within
which it operates. 50 As a result, different policy factors
will need to be considered; for example, as some commentators have suggested, ‘‘[t]he ISP makes a very attractive defendant because it is more readily identifiable in
the realm of cyberspace where user anonymity is often
the norm, because of the jurisdictional problems that
arise from the global nature of the Internet, and because
the ISP may have deep pockets’’. 51 Whether or not these
are indeed appropriate policy factors for consideration,
they indicate that the kind of policy debate that must be
had is substantially at the macro level, and should fall
under the ‘‘residual’’ policy considerations in the second
part of the test. The problem with Cooper is that it
potentially prevents courts from ever reaching this stage.
If analogy is not to be had, a judge may not find sufficient identifiable ‘‘closeness’’ in the relationship to
ground proximity. The ‘‘residual’’ policy considerations
that would better inform the issue are left unearthed.
More generally, there is a potentially large variety of
‘‘relationships’’ to try to fit within the contours of the
existing duty-of-care structure. As Professor Owens
recently noted in these pages, 52 the list of potential
defendants in a case involving worms or viruses could
include anti-virus software manufacturers, proprietors of
infected electronic commerce Web sites, security consultants and auditors, application service providers, and
ISPs, inter alia. 53 There is usually no physical closeness,
often no geographical neighbourhood, and even the
functional proximity will be questionable in some cases.
The legal regime for dealing with ‘‘novel’’ claims is going
to get a workout in the coming years and decades, but it
may not be up to the task.

Case Studies

T

he question that the foregoing suggests, then, is
simply this: can the Cooper duty-of-care test,
designed to proceed cautiously from known categories of
neighbours, also figure out whether it is ‘‘fair and just’’ to
impose a duty of care as between netizens? The answer is
necessarily speculative, but it may be useful to pose a
couple of fact scenarios and estimate how they would
fare under a Cooper analysis.
On Friday, February 6, 2004, RealNetworks
announced that it had discovered flaws in different ver-
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sions of its popular media player, RealPlayer, which
could allow attackers to create corrupt music or video
files that, when played, would allow the attacker to take
control of the victim’s personal computer. 5 4
RealNetworks quickly released a patch to fix the
problem, which one report noted could ‘‘affect a large
portion of the 350 million unique registered users of’’
RealPlayer. 55 Suppose that an attacker created a corrupt
mp3 (digital music file), which he or she released by way
of a file-sharing service like Kazaa, and that the victims
included both registered and un-registered users of RealPlayer, as well as a corporation whose employee
downloaded and played the corrupt file.
The various other negligence issues, such as standard of care, causation, and remoteness, aside, even the
duty-of-care issue begins to read like a first-year Torts
exam. Who are the defendants, and who owes whom a
duty of care under Cooper? The obvious beginning
point is the attacker. While commentators generally
agree that in principle such an individual, if he or she
could be found, would be liable, 56 this would seem to
come fairly close to being a ‘‘novel claim’’ in Canadian
negligence law. He or she clearly comes within the first
step, since harm was eminently foreseeable and, in fact,
intended. 57 Moving to proximity, care against potential
harm from malicious code is not (to my knowledge) a
recognized duty of care in Canada. Analogy is difficult;
one thinks of a defendant negligently creating a power
surge that could cause property damage to persons on
the same power grid. However, the latter example
derives its duty of care from geographical, or at least
physical, proximity, not to mention the fact of the potential for physical harm (i.e., property damage). The RealPlayer attacker, by contrast, has set in motion a force that
may cause pure economic loss to a large group of people
who have nothing more in common than RealPlayer on
their hard drive and an Internet connection. It is not a
recognized category of pure economic loss. Precedent
and analogy fail us.
Thus, the analysis must move to those factors that
might make it ‘‘fair and just’’ to impose a duty of care.
Cooper provides examples — expectations, representations, reliance, the property or other interests involved,
the ‘‘closeness’’ of the relationship — but aside from the
exceedingly general ‘‘other interests’’, these are not overly
helpful. The aspect of the Internet that makes it such an
incredible tool — its ability to electronically link millions of people — is what may defy any notion of ‘‘closeness’’ as the term is to be understood under Cooper. It is
difficult to conceive of the attacker, who simply releases
malevolent code out into the electronic stream to be
picked up by the unaware, as being ‘‘proximate’’ to any
of the hypothetical victims. In this case, we never move
to the larger, societal or ‘‘residual’’ policy implications of
the decision.
The flip side of the equation is that despite the
Cooper criteria, it is not difficult to arrive at the opinion
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that it would be ‘‘fair and just’’ to allow a cause of action
as between the victims and the attacker. To do this,
however, we must examine the Internet as the sui
generis thing that it is. The fairness and justice of
imposing the duty of care here derives from the very
nature of the relationship and the setting within which it
occurs, and not from analogy to categories of negligence
that have gone before. The attacker, as an Internet user, is
not only neglecting a duty to other netizens but knows
that the file is virtually certain to cause injury of some
kind 58 to a wide variety of people. The nature of the
Internet allows him or her to reach many more victims
than would be physically possible. The far-flung intimacy of Internet users, despite lacking any hallmarks of
traditional ‘‘proximity’’, nonetheless makes it just and fair
to impose the duty of care.

Cooper does not necessarily foreclose this kind of
inquiry, but the fit is an uncomfortable one. 59 The
former Anns framework would arguably have produced
a different result; once the victim made out that the
harm was foreseeable, the onus would have been on the
defendant to present policy factors that justified not
imposing a duty of care in this situation. The policy
debate would have to have been held in its entirety at
the second stage, where both relationship-based and
societal policy factors could be balanced against one
another to tailor the result to the tech setting. Procedurally, unlike Cooper, the defendant would not have the
advantage of being entitled to two efforts at refuting the
novel duty of care (with the burden of proof on the
plaintiff). Substantively, the Court would have more flexibility in terms of taking a truly holistic view of the
relationship in question, rather than being hamstrung by
adherence to the new proximity analysis.
What about RealNetworks, which created the faulty
software and made it easy to download and install,
leaving the victims open to the bad code? This part of
the analysis fares better under Cooper, mostly because it
has a products liability angle. RealNetworks obviously
owes a duty of care to registered users of its product,
because negligent construction of the product could
foreseeably cause harm to the ultimate consumer, and
because products liability is an established category of
negligence. Both the unregistered users and the corporation are arguably foreseeable users or third parties. The
law regarding pure economic loss will apply to include
or exclude certain claims; any policy debate will be had
at the residual policy step where it properly belongs in
any event.
Let us take a different scenario. Suppose an unidentified party hacks into the network of a large law firm
and uses it as a conduit to hack into the systems of the
firm’s clients with which the firm’s network is integrated. 60 Suppose as well that one of these clients is the
Regional Health Authority and that the hacker gains
access to the computer system of a major hospital, where
his or her negligent hacking not only destroys digitized
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records but knocks out the primary power system.
Backup power covers off most vital machinery, but several patients are injured when some systems fail because
of the blackout.
The hacker being unidentified (and likely judgment-proof), both the hospital and the individual victims
look to the law firm for recovery. It is certainly foreseeable that negligent protection of a network could lead to
harm to those parties, such as the hospital, who were
electronically connected to it. Again, one struggles for a
precise analogy to existing caselaw, but if one takes a
broad approach, then property damage by way of computer negligence will likely turn up on the proximity
radar. The patients present a thornier problem. Foreseeability is not an issue, but there does not seem to be a
previously established category from which to draw. Is
‘‘negligence indirectly causing physical injury’’ enough in
this setting? The closest analogy might be where the
power company itself negligently allowed the third party
to cause the blackout. The difference for proximity, however, is that the link between the firm’s network and that
of the hospital is only incidental to their commercial
relationship. The link does not truly come within the
scope of the firm’s provision of ‘‘services’’ to the hospital,
which might otherwise be sufficient to ground the thirdparty claim of the patients. The relationship between the
patients and the firm is therefore that much less proximate.
If there is no analogy, then closeness must be sought
through the proximity analysis for this novel case. Once
again, there is little in the way of expectations, representations, reliance, or property interests upon which to
base a finding of ‘‘closeness.’’ The fact of actual physical
injury must surely be taken into account, but one could
expect a heated argument from the firm that it would
hardly be ‘‘fair and just’’ that by simply running its own
computer network (which virtually every company does)
it should be opened up to claims from any third party
who might be affected, somehow, somewhere. 61 Must
every computer network operator have a duty to take
care with regard to anyone who may be affected by its
negligence? Surely not, but on what principled basis can
we impose limitations? Those we are used to, such as
geography, do not really apply any more. Cooper does
not help in this task. The debate that must be had is in
the realm of the larger, extraneous or ‘‘residual’’ policy
concerns of the second step, but the proximity analysis
keeps us from ever getting there.
One can easily imagine twists and turns on these or
other scenarios. What if the law firm’s negligence allows
a virus to emanate from its network that shuts down and
damages half of Lower Manhattan? My point here, however, is not to speculate on the ‘‘what-ifs’’ of tech torts,
but to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s approach
in Cooper may ultimately tie the hands of the courts. An
approach based on the language and conceptual
frameworks of days past has the strong potential to pro-
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duce undue rigidity when assessing truly novel claims or
those with novel aspects. This is not to say that openminded judges cannot make the leaps required, but the
structure of the Cooper test actually holds them back in
their ability to do so. This does more than accomplish
the somewhat laudable goal of restraining the careless
extension of duty of care — it prevents the adaptation of
the common law of negligence to new subject matter,
which defeats the most profound strength of the
common law.

like-minded states, may ultimately be the best vehicle
through which to proceed. Yet I am reluctant to concede
the inability of the common law to continue its mostly
proud tradition of compensating the injured, providing
education and deterrence, and even simply moving
money around the economy in a principled way. There
is no doubt that some of the issues to be considered are
manifestly different than those that have gone before.
The beauty of Donoghue, however, was that the ‘‘neighbour principle’’ was amenable to being extended on a
principled basis, anywhere, at any time.

Conclusion

It is certainly important that the rigour that currently exists in negligence law be reinforced, so that the
expansion of negligence law to embrace technologically
based relationships does not bring us to that ‘‘day when
liability will be determined routinely on a case by case
basis, ‘under all the circumstances’ basis, with decision
makers (often juries) guided only by the broadest of
general principles.’’ 63 However, if Anns was too liberating
a structure for duty of care, I have argued here that
Cooper represents too great a retreat. It may prevent
negligence from blossoming into an effective adjunct to
both legislative and self-regulation. It may be, as the old
song goes, that duty of care has left us — just when we
needed it most.
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n 1893, Lord Esher wrote of duty of care, ‘‘a person is
entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the
whole world if he owes no duty to them.’’ 62 Over a
century later, we have arrived at a time when all the
world is, potentially, your neighbour. This idea was at
the heart of Donoghue, and was a startling one for its
time. Today, society takes this for granted, but the law
has yet to catch up.
It may be that, in promoting the extension of negligence law into the tech sector, I am attempting to fit
square pegs into round holes. Legislation, in tandem
with jurisdictional and technical co-operation among
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